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qualifying provision that under the circumstances prevailing in
that case the trial judge correctly found the defendant sane and
that there was no abuse of discretion, since all the testimony
showed sanity.' 8
CHAREST

D. THIBAUT.

NAVIGABILITY AS APPLIED TO LAKES IN LOUISIANA
Louisiana's peculiar topographical structure including an
abundance of bayous, creeks, swamps, and lowlands frequently
covered by water has been, with the discovery of rich oil deposits
under these waters, a source of frequent litigation in the past few
decades. The jurisprudence on the legal questions involved has
been most controversial. However, through diligent efforts on
the part of the courts, legal doctrines derived in the more recent
cases1 would appear to solve many of the more crucial problems.
Since the drafters of our code omitted an express provision
regarding lakes,2 perhaps the most troublesome issue presented
has been whether or not Articles 509 and 510 of the Civil Code
apply to these bodies of water. An examination of the cases does
not reveal to the student of the subject a clear definition of the
word "lake." Any adequate treatment of the problems raised
by these uncertainties must necessarily be concerned with the
divergent rules applicable to navigable and non-navigable lakes.
Navigable Lakes
Litigation on the question may arise
of a riparian owner to alluvion additions
way when the waterline has receded. It
a claim by the state to an area which has
waters of the lake.$

by a claim on the part
to the bed of a watermay also arise through
been submerged by the

18. In State v. Messer, 194 La. 238, 193 So. 633 (1940). the supreme court
held that the judge did not abuse his discretion when he refused to allow the
defendant to withdraw a not guilty plea and plead present insanity on the
day of the second trial following a mistrial in the original trial when the
judge was convinced by examination and observation of the defendant that

he was presently sane and felt that the plea of present insanity was filed
solely for purposes of delay.

1. State v. Aucoin, 206 La. 787, 20 So. (2d) 136 (1944); Transcontinental
Petroleum Corp. v. Texas Co., 24 So. (2d) 248 (La. 1946).

2. Art. 558, French Civil Code, was omitted from the Louisiana Codes.

The French article stated: "Alluvion does not take place in connection with

lakes and ponds, of which the owner always retains the land covered by
the water when it reaches the level of the outlet of the pond, even if the
volume of water should decrease."

3. State v. Capdeville, 146 La. 94, 83 So. 421 (1919); State v. Bozeman, 156
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The former question was first raised in cases involving Lake
Pontchartrain.4 In these decisions, the court, by classing Lake
Pontchartrain as an "arm of the sea," eliminated any necessity
for deciding whether Articles 509 and 510 were applicable to
lakes. In one of these cases, 5 however, there are dicta to the effect
that lakes do not come within the scope of the laws of alluvion
and dereliction. Since that decision, the courts have consistently
held that the rights of riparian owners under Articles 509 and 510
do not extend to lakes.0
The establishment of this rule considered in the light of the
Roman maxim, "Qui sentit onus, sentire debet commondum,"
was the foundation for argument in the bitterly contested cases
of the second class to which we have referred (where the state
claimed eroded areas which had been submerged by the waters
of a navigable lake).
The issue was squarely presented to the court in State v. Erwin.8 In this case the body of water was Lake Calcasieu, which
had submerged certain lands claimed by the defendant under patents conveying title up to the shore line of the lake as it was at
the time Louisiana was admitted into the Union. The purpose of
the suit was to establish title to that land. Justice Overton, in presenting the majority opinion, reviewed the history of Articles
509 and 510, 9 sustaining the view previously expressed that those
articles were not applicable to lakes. It was held that the defendant retained title to the land, even though it now formed
part of the bed of a navigable waterway. Three members of the
court dissented vigorously to this holding, contending that public
policy as expressed in Articles 450 and 453 of the Civil Code
precluded private ownership of the bed of a navigable lake. This
dissent invited a renewed argument on the question, when it was
again presented in Miami Corporationv. State.10 This was five
La. 635, 101 So. 4 (1924); Smith v. Dixie Oil Co., 156 La. 691, 101 So. 24 (1924);
State v. Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co., 183 La. 304, 163 So. 145 (1935).
4. Zeller v. Southern Yacht Club, 34 La. Ann. 837 (1882); Burns v. Crescent Gun and Rod Club, 116 La. 1038, 41 So. 249 (1906); Bruning v. City of
New Orleans, 165 La. 511, 115 So. 733 (1928).
5. Zeller v. Southern Yacht Club, 34 La. Ann. 837 (1882).
6. Zeller v. Southern Yacht Club, 34 La. Ann. 837 (1882); State v. Standard Oil Co., 164 La. 334, 113 So. 867 (1927); Slattery v. Arkansas Natural Gas
Co., 138 La. 793, 70 So. 806 (1916).
7. "He who bears the burden of a thing ought also to experience the
advantage arising from it." Black's Law Dictionary (1933) 1482.
8. 173 La. 507, 138 So. 84 (1931).
9. Arts. 556 and 557 of the French Civil Code are substantially, and in
fact almost literally, the same as our Code Articles 509 and 510.
10. 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1936).
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years after the Erwin decision, and in the meanwhile a change
in the personnel of the court had occurred.
The facts and issues presented in the Miami Corporationcase
were substantially the same as those of the Erwin case. Nevertheless, in the later case, a majority of the court refused to accept
the Erwin decision. The court was of the opinion that the bed
of a navigable body of water belongs to the state by virtue of
her sovereignty, it being a public thing and insusceptible of private ownership under the provisions of Articles 450 and 453 of
the Civil Code. Having arrived at this conclusion, the court
deemed it unnecessary to consider the applicability of Articles
509 and 510. As in the Erwin case there was a dissent by three
members of the court. Chief Justice O'Niell, who wrote the dissenting opinion, not only insisted that the majority view of the
earlier decision was in accordance with the law, but realistically
challenged the court's public policy as a basis for the decision. He
pointed out that the extent of the hindrance to navigation interposed by the presence of an oil derrick is in no wise affected by
the fact that the lease was acquired through public, rather than
private, ownership. While this argument is worthy of careful
consideration it cannot be deemed to refute the basis of public
policy offered to substantiate the majority view. Justice Higgins,
in supporting the decision, stated:
"Beyond the point where the shore was in 1812, one using the
lake, although navigable, would be a trespasser on private
property, and the trespasser would have no right to use the
bank which was not inundated, since it would not be the
bank of a navigable public water."'
From a practical viewpoint, the decision is actually justified on
the ground of public policy, as the ownership of the banks of the
lake by private individuals would for all practical purposes preclude navigation. Since the Miami Corporation case is a later
decision it might be assumed that the law governing navigable
waters is well established and it seems highly improbable that
the court would again reverse its position. However, as the Miami
Corporationcase is based on public policy, the question as to the
applicability of Articles 509 and 510 is still open to argument.
If the law is settled that Articles 509 and 510 have no application to lakes, what, then is the basis of the persistent litigation
that has taken place in later years? One of the many factors that
foster such controversies is illustrated in Amerada Petroleum
11. 186 La. 784, 798, 173 So. 315, 319.
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Corporation v. State Mineral Board.12 In this case it was virtually conceded by the contending parties that the articles of the
Civil Code on alluvion and dereliction did not apply to lakes.
But there was a bitter contest as to whether the body of water
under consideration, the arm of Grand Lake, was a lake or a
"river or other stream." The court, after considering numerous
definitions of rivers, lakes, and streams, concluded
"that a lake does not imply a body of water in which a current flows, but it indicates a body of water, more or less stagnant, in which the water is supplied from drainage. . . .A
river is distinguished from a lake in that it flows, more or less,
in a permanent bd or channel between defined banks or walls
with a current, whereas streams are bodies of flowing water
including rivers. A stream, therefore, includes any body of
flowing water."18
Justice Rogers found under this definition that since the arm of
Grand Lake was a body of flowing water with the power to form
accretions, it was necessarily a stream. Consequently, Article 509
was held applicable and the plaintiff was entitled to the accretions formed to the shore. This decision, considered in the light
of Louisiana jurisprudence, exemplifies the fact that, despite all
else, the geophysical factors involved will of necessity continue
to prove a prolific source of litigation.
Non-Navigable Lakes
In the recent case of State v. Aucoin, 4 the court found the
lake in question navigable. Nonetheless the complex problems
involving the law as to non-navigable lakes were presented. Justice Fournet strenuously dissented from the majority view. He
arrived at the conclusion that the body of water in question had
not been navigable in 1812 and thus the law as to non-navigable
lakes applied. The purpose of the suit was to establish the boundary between the land, which was once the bed of Lake Long, in
Lafourche Parish, and the adjoining land owned by the defendant. The plaintiff's contention was that since the lake had been
navigable at the time of Louisiana's admission to the Union title
to the land was vested in the State of Louisiana by virtue of her
sovereignty. In the alternative the state maintained she had
acquired ownership of the lake bed by the swamp land grants of
12. 203 La. 473, 14 So. (2d) 61 (1943).
13. 203 La. 473, 495, 14 So. (2d) 61, 68.
14. 206 La. 787, 20 So. (2d) 136 (1944).
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1849 and 1850.15 Aucoin contended that if he had not acquired
his title to the land in question by deed or by prescription, then
he had acquired the lake bed by accretion and dereliction, on the
theory that since the lake was a non-navigable body of water,
the riparian proprietor's title extended into the bed of the lake
to the center thread thereof. The court rendered judgment for
the state, finding Lake Long to have been navigable in 1812. In
order to bring the merits of Fournet's dissent into focus, however, let us assume that the majority opinion had found the lake
to be non-navigable.
Under this assumption, the interesting proposition is presented: What are the riparian rights of one whose land borders
upon the lake? This question assumes importance when considered with Act 258 of 1910,"" which provides that the beds of lakes
not under the direct ownership of any person, firm or corporation
are property of the state. If this act is to be accepted at face
value, a claim by a riparian owner will be adverse to that of the
state in every case except where the lake is under the direct
ownership of some person, firm or corporation. Thus, in the
Aucoin case, even if the state's claim to the land under the
swamp land grant could not be sustained, the state would have
title to the bed of the lake under the statute of 1910. Therefore,
the proposition which at first blush appears to be superfluous is
in essence the only question that will confront the courts. Obviously, if there is direct ownership, riparian rights will not be
claimed under the law of dereliction.
As in the situation regarding navigable lakes, the factual
set-up may be presented in either of two ways. The lake may
go dry and the riparian proprietor will claim to the center thread
of the bed; or the waters of the lake may submerge the owner's
land and the state will claim the submerged area. If Lake Long
had been found non-navigable, the former situation would have
been similar to that presented in the Aucoin case. Chief Justice
O'Niell said in answer to the above mentioned proposition:
"Certainly the riparian rights of an owner of land bordering
upon a lake do not entitle him to become the owner of the bed
of the lake by effect of its becoming dry, either in whole or in
part, if the state owns the bed of the lake while it is covered
with water."' 7
15. Act of Congress of 1849, 9 Stat. 352 (1850), 43 U.S.C.A. § 982 et seq.,
granted the State of Louisiana all swamp and overflowed lands in the state.
16. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 9182-9183.
17. 206 La. 787, 826, 20 So. (2d) 136, 149 (1944).
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This dictum is based upon the court's holding that Articles 509
and 510 have no application to lakes.18
Fournet's dissent maintained that the law of Louisiana provides that the bed of a non-navigable body of water is deemed
to be the property of the adjoining landowners to the center
thread thereof. To substantiate that contention he made reference to four Louisiana decisions.19 This argument is weakened,
however, by the fact that each of the cases referred to may be
distinguished from the case at bar. In each of them it is clear
that the body of water under consideration was not a lake. Possibly the confusion on the matter of riparian rights as to nonnavigable lakes has been occasioned by a failure to distinguish
between those cases where navigability or non-navigability was
the crux of the state versus private ownership issue. Prior to
the act of 1910 it was possible to have a body of water classified
as a non-navigable lake which was not under the direct ownership of either the state or private individuals. Consequently, it
was argued that Articles 509 and 510 should be applied so that
ownership of the bed of the lake would be vested. However the
act under question would provide for this situation and the state
would become owner of the property. In essence, the situation is
so changed by the statute that when riparian rights are claimed
as to non-navigable lakes, they are not against unclaimed land
but against state owned land. As brought out in the Aucoin case,
there seems to be no reason why the state should lose her title
under such conditions, a non-navigable lake being a private
thing and susceptible of private ownership. This conception is in
accord with the French theory that a non-navigable lake should
be treated as real property.20 Granting the state's right to own
real property, the riparian owner's rights should be the same with
respect to both private and state ownership. Certainly in a case
where a person owns only the bed of a non-navigable lake, the
courts are not going to extend the riparian owner's rights to the
center thread thereof. Therefore, it would seem that the rule
proclaimed in the Aucoin case as to non-navigable lakes, even
though it be considered no more than dictum, should be followed.
18. See McDade v. Bossier Levee Board, 109 La. 625, 33 So. 628 (1902);
Bank of Coushatta v. Yarborough, 139 La. 510, 71 So. 784 (1916). These cases
concern non-navigable lakes but may be distinguished from the supposititious case proposed.
19. Palmer Co. v. Wilkinson, 141 La. 874, 75 So. 806 (1917); Amite Gravel
and Sand Co. v. Roseland Gravel Co., 148 La. 704, 87 So. 718 (1921); Wemple
v. Eastham, 150 La. 247, 90 So. 637 (1922); Bodcaw Lumber Co. of La. v. Kendall, 161 La. 337, 108 So. 664 (1926).
20. I Colin et Capitant, Droit Civil Franiais (7 ed. 1902) 80, § 246.
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Of course, the adoption of this rule would by implication include in the second category of cases (where the state as owner
of a non-navigable lake is claiming a submerged area) the law
expressed in the Erwin case relative to navigable lakes. Certainly there would be no reason for interposing public policy
upon which the decision in the Miami Corporation case was
based. Thus, as to non-navigable lakes we would have an application of the maxim, "Qui sentit onus, sentire debet et commondem," or at least a preservation of the status quo in accord21
ance with the Roman law theory as to non-navigable lakes.
What then is Navigable Water?
This question has frequently been presented to Louisiana
courts.2 2 In setting up criteria for determining navigability, the
court's definitions often lead to divergent results. It is not the
purpose here to consider the isolated rules, but rather to compare the recent decisions with the long line of jurisprudence on
the subject. A definition adhered to rather consistently by the
courts provides that in order that a stream be regarded as navigable it is necessary that it
"either be used or be susceptible of being used 'in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade
and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes

of trade and travel on water.'

23

In the previously discussed Aucoin case, Chief Justice O'Niell
makes a diligent effort to explain the Louisiana rules on the conflicting doctrines regarding the navigability of lakes. He points
out that in considering the question, the terms navigable and
navigated should not be confused. He also urges that it is important to bear in mind the undeveloped state of water transportation at the time of Louisiana's admission to the Union.
Both of these factors are certainly important. Louisiana, by vir21. D.41.1.12. 9 Scott, The Civil Law (1932) 161: "Although lakes and
ponds sometimes increase in dimensions, and sometimes dry up, they still
retain their original boundaries, and therefore the right of alluvion is not
admitted, so far as they are concerned."
22. State v. Capdeville, 146 La. 94, 83 So. 421 (1919); Amite Gravel and
Sand Co. v. Roseland Gravel Co., 148 La. 704, 87 So. 718 (1921); State v. Bozeman, 156 La. 635, 101 So. 4 (1924); State v. Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co.,
183 La. 304, 163 So. 145 (1935); State v. Aucoin, 206 La. 787, 20 So. (2d) 136
(1944).
23. State v. Aucoin, 206 La. 787, 855, 20 So. (2d) 136, 158 (1944). See Delta
Duck Club v. Barrios, 135 La. 357, 65 So. 489 (1914); State v. Capdeville, 146
La, 94, 83 So. 421 (1919); Amite Gravel and Sand Co. v. Roseland Gravel Co.,
148 La. 704, 87 So. 718 (1921); State v. Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co., 183
La. 304, 163 So. 145 (1935).

19461

COMMENTS

tue of her sovereignty, was declared owner of all navigable
streams in 1812. There appears no sound basis for maintaining
that these streams must have actually been navigated. Certainly
the grant, based on public policy, was merely in anticipation of
the future navigation of the then scarcely settled state. Equally
important is a consideration of the modes of water transportation
which were in use at that date. Included were only scows, rafts,
and flatboats. 2 With these factors in mind the latest definition as
established by the court would appear to be the present indication of the rule of navigability-a body of water is considered
navigable when, by its depth, width, and location it is available
for commerce, irrespective of whether it is actually so used or
26
not.2 5 Thus, the question becomes one of fact.

There are many who contend that the above mentioned rule
is too easily satisfied and that under so loose a definition almost
any body of water may be classified as navigable. In view of the
decision in the recent case of Transcontinental Petroleum Corporation v. Texas Company,27 that criticism loses much of its
significance in practice. In this case the plaintiffs were claiming
title to mineral rights under a lease from the state to the former
bed of Bayou Ledet. Title depended upon the establishment of
the navigability of Bayou Ledet in the year 1812. While the
lake had been decreased considerably in size at the time of the
trial, the plaintiffs offered abundant evidence to sustain the allegation that the body of water had been navigable in 1812. The
lake had become partially filled in as a result of the removal of
a raft from the Atchafalaya River in 1860. The plaintiff introduced expert testimony in its attempt to account for the present
condition of the basin. It claimed that there were three factors
that had accelerated sedimentation: (1) the removal of the great
raft in the Atchafalaya River, (2) the construction of artificial
levees in the basin in the past ten years, and (3) the construction of a railroad bed through the central part of the basin. On
the other hand, the defendants advanced substantive evidence
to sustain their theory that the basin had filled in before 1812 and
that Bayou Ledet had ceased to be navigable prior to that date.
The only facts, however, of which the court readily took cogni24. Smith v. Dixie Oil Co., 156 La. 691, 101 So. 24 (1924); State v. Aucoin,
206 La. 787, 20 So. (2d) 136 (1944).
25. Burns v. Crescent Gun and Rod Club, 116 La. 1038, 41 So. "249 (1906);
Caddo Levee District v. Glassel, 120 La. 400, 45 So. 370 (1907); Atchafalaya
Land Co. v. James, 146 La. 109, 83 So. 426 (1919); State v. Capdeville, 146 La.
94, 88 So. 421 (1919).
26. Ibid.
27. 24 So. (2d) 248 (La. 1946).
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zance, was proof that large cypress trees, whose germination and
growth could be traced back into the centuries, had grown in
the bed of Bayou Ledet. This evidence was supported by the
testimony of the defendants' ecologist. Hence, according to the
theory of the defendants, the bayou could not have been navigable in 1812.
Concerning the numerous theories offered and of the copious
evidence presented to sustain them, the court said:
"Although I am not prepared to say that the defendants have
established the fact that Ledet was not navigable on April 30,
1812, likewise, I am unprepared to say that plaintiffs have established the fact that it was. The plaintiffs have therefore
failed to discharge their legal burden of proving their case by
a preponderance of the evidence, and hence cannot succeed in
'2 8
their claim.
This decision, which placed the burden of proof on the party who
claimed that the body of water was navigable, completes the
composite picture of navigability previously discussed. This position, if adhered to, should lead to consistent, equitable decisions.
Conclusion
After considering many of the court's decisions, it would
appear that the law as expressed in State v. Aucoin is substantially correct as to navigable and non-navigable lakes and as to
the criterion for determining navigability itself. While it is recognized that there are strong arguments on both sides of these
controversial matters, it would appear that for purposes of security of property rights and stability of commercial transactions
the Aucoin case should be followed for settling future controversies.
WALLACE A. HUNTER
28. Id. at 253.

